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**Information technology — TLS  
specification for storage systems**

*Technologies de l'information — Spécification TLS pour systèmes de  
stockage*

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## Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see [www.iso.org/directives](http://www.iso.org/directives)).

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see [www.iso.org/patents](http://www.iso.org/patents)).

Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not constitute an endorsement.

For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see the following URL: [Foreword – Supplementary information](#).

ISO/IEC 20648 was prepared by the Storage Networking Industry Association (SNIA) [as TLS Specification for Storage Systems, Version 1.0.1] and was adopted, under the PAS procedure, by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, in parallel with its approval by the national bodies of ISO and IEC. The content of ISO/IEC 20648 and SNIA TLS Specification for Storage Systems Version 1.0.1 is identical.

## Introduction

Within Information and Communications Technology (CT), one of the best defenses against telecommunications attacks is to deploy security services implemented with mechanisms specified in standards that are thoroughly vetted in the public domain and rigorously tested by third party laboratories, by vendors, and by users of commercial off-the-shelf products. Three services that most often address network user security requirements are confidentiality, message integrity and authentication.

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) with its Transport Layer Security (TLS) has a standard that is able to prevent tampering, message forgery, and eavesdropping by encrypting data units, or segments, from one end of the transport layer to the other. In addition, TLS is application protocol independent, which means higher-level protocols like HTTP can layer on top of the TLS protocol transparently.

Additional details beyond the basic TLS protocol specification are necessary to ensure both security and interoperability. This specification provides that detail in the form of specific requirements and guidance for using Transport Layer Security (TLS) in conjunction with storage systems.

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# Information technology — TLS specification for storage systems

## 1 Scope

This specification details the requirements for use of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol in conjunction with data storage technologies. The requirements set out in this specification are intended to facilitate secure interoperability of storage clients and servers as well as non-storage technologies that may have similar interoperability needs.

This specification is relevant to anyone involved in owning, operating or using data storage devices. This includes senior managers, acquirers of storage product and service, and other non-technical managers or users, in addition to managers and administrators who have specific responsibilities for information security and/or storage security, storage operation, or who are responsible for an organization's overall security program and security policy development. It is also relevant to anyone involved in the planning, design and implementation of the architectural aspects of storage security.

## 2 Normative references

The following referenced documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 27000, *Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management systems — Overview and vocabulary*

IETF RFC 5280, *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile*, IETF, 2008

IETF RFC 5246, *The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2*, IETF, 2008

IETF RFC 5746, *Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension*, IETF, 2010

## 3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 27000 and the following apply.

### 3.1 cipher suite

named combination of authentication, encryption, and message authentication code algorithms used to negotiate the security settings for a network connection

Note 1 to entry: Cipher suites are typically used with the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) network protocols.

### 3.2 digital certificate

data structure signed with a digital signature that is based on a public key and which asserts that the key belongs to a subject identified in the structure

3.3

**perfect forward secrecy**

security condition in which a leaving entity cannot obtain any subsequent shared secret keys

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 11770-5:2011, 3.24]

3.4

**proxy**

intermediary that acts as both a server and a client for the purpose of making requests on behalf of other clients

3.5

**self-signed certificate**

*digital certificate* (3.2) that is signed by the same entity whose identity it certifies

Note 1 to entry: A self-signed certificate is one signed with its own private key.

3.6

**security strength**

a number associated with the amount of work (i.e. the number of operations) that is required to break a cryptographic algorithm or system

Note 1 to entry: Security strength is specified in bits, and is a specific value from the set {80, 112, 128, 192, 256}. A security strength of  $b$  bits means that of the order of  $2^b$  operations are required to break the system.

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, 3.14]

**4 Symbols and abbreviated terms**

3DES	Triple Data Encryption Standard
AED	Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CA	Certificate Authority
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CDMI	Cloud Data Management Interface
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CRLDP	CRL Distribution Point
DER	Distinguished Encoding Rules
DHE	Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDHE	Elliptic Curve Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EDE	Encryption-Decryption-Encryption
GCM	Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC	Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IP	Internet Protocol
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MD5	Message Digest 5
OCSF	Online Certificate Status Protocol



PEM	Privacy Enhanced Mail
PKCS	Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PSK	Pre-Shared Key
RFC	Request For Comment
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman algorithm
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SMI-S	Storage Management Initiative – Specification
SNIA	Storage Networking Industry Association
SSL	Secure Socket Layer
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security

## 5 Overview and concepts

### 5.1 General

Data storage systems and infrastructure increasingly use technologies such as protocols over TCP/IP to manage the systems and data as well as to access the data. In many situations, the historical reliance on isolated connectivity, specialized technologies, and the physical security of data centers are not sufficient to protect data, especially when the data is considered sensitive and/or high value. Thus, there is a need to include security at the transport layer and at the same time, ensure interoperability.

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, the Security Socket Layer (SSL), have been used successfully to protect a wide range of communications over TCP/IP. Recognizing this fact, the storage industry has mandated the use of TLS/SSL in conjunction with the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) for multiple specifications (see 5.2). Unfortunately, these storage specifications tend to be lengthy and complex, resulting in long development cycles that don't allow for rapid requirements changes due to security vulnerabilities or new attacks.

The objectives for this specification are to:

- Specify the TLS elements necessary to secure storage management and data access
- Facilitate timely updates and enhancements to the security for the storage specifications
- Ensure storage clients and systems can interoperate securely
- Support non-storage technologies that may have similar TLS interoperability needs

### 5.2 Storage specifications

As a starting point, the TLS requirements were extracted from the following specification:

- ISO/IEC 17826:2012, Information technology — Cloud Data Management Interface (CDMI)
- Storage Networking Industry Association (SNIA), Storage Management Initiative – Specification (SMI-S), Version 1.6.1

These requirements were then harmonized, eliminating minor differences. The resulting requirements (see [clause 6](#)) have been updated to reflect the current state of TLS and attack mitigation strategies.

## 5.3 Overview of TLS

### 5.3.1 TLS Background

TLS is a protocol that provides communications security over networks. It allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. TLS is layered on top of some reliable transport protocol (e.g., TCP), and it is used for encapsulation of various higher-level protocols (e.g., HTTP).

TLS version 1.2 of the protocol is specified in IETF RFC 5246. Earlier, and less secure, versions of TLS are also specified and in use; TLS versions 1.0 is specified in IETF RFC 2246 and TLS versions 1.1 is specified in IETF RFC 4346. The predecessor to TLS, The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), and in particular, version 3.0 is also in use, but also considered less secure; SSL 3.0 is documented in the historical IETF RFC 6101, *The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0*.

### 5.3.2 TLS functionality

TLS provides endpoint authentication and communications privacy over the network using cryptography. Typically, only the server is authenticated (i.e., its identity is ensured) while the client remains unauthenticated; this means that the end user (whether an individual or an application) has a measure of assurance with whom they are communicating. Mutual authentication (the identities of both endpoints are verified) requires, with few exceptions, the deployment of digital certificates on the client.

TLS involves three basic phases:

- a) Peer negotiation for algorithm support
- b) Key exchange and authentication
- c) Symmetric cipher encryption and message authentication

During the first phase, the client and server negotiate cipher suites (see 5.3.3), which determine the ciphers to be used, the key exchange, authentication algorithms, and the Message Authentication Codes (MACs). The key exchange and authentication algorithms are typically public key algorithms. The MACs are made up from a keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, or HMAC.

### 5.3.3 Summary of cipher suites

Both TLS and SSL 3.0 package one key establishment, confidentiality, signature and hash algorithm into a "cipher suite." A registered 16-bit (4 hexadecimal digit) number, called the cipher suite index, is assigned for each defined cipher suite. For example, RSA key agreement, RSA signature, Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) using Encryption-Decryption-Encryption (EDE) and Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) confidentiality, and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) hash are assigned the hexadecimal value {0x000A} and given a label of TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_3DES\_EDE\_CBC\_SHA for TLS.

To ensure a measure of interoperability between clients and servers, each version of TLS specifies a mandatory cipher suite<sup>1)</sup> that all compliant applications are required to implement. The following are the mandatory cipher suites associated with the different versions of TLS:

- **TLS 1.0:** TLS\_DHE\_DSS\_WITH\_3DES\_EDE\_CBC\_SHA {0x00, 0x13}
- **TLS 1.1:** TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_3DES\_EDE\_CBC\_SHA {0x00, 0x0A}
- **TLS 1.2:** TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA {0x00, 0x0F}

The client always initiates the TLS session and starts cipher suite negotiation by transmitting a handshake message that lists the cipher suites (by index value) that it will accept. The server responds

1) Section 9 - *Mandatory Cipher Suites* of each of the corresponding TLS IETF RFCs is where these mandatory cipher suites are specified. The mandatory cipher suite is required to be implemented and supported in the absence of an application profile.

with a handshake message indicating which cipher suite it selected from the list or an “abort.” Although the client orders its list of cipher suite by preference, starting with the most preferred, the server may choose any of the cipher suites proposed by the client. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the negotiation will select the strongest suite. If no cipher suites are mutually supported, the connection is aborted.

NOTE When the negotiated options, including optional public key certificates and random data for developing keying material to be used by the cryptographic algorithms, are complete, messages are exchanged to place the communications channel in a secure mode.

### 5.3.4 X.509 digital certificates

TLS uses X.509 version 3 public key certificates that are conformant with the *Certificate and Certificate Extension Profile* defined in [Section 4](#) of IETF RFC 5280. This certificate and certificate revocation list (CRL) profile specifies the mandatory fields included in the certificate as well as optional fields and extensions that may be included in the certificate. These X.509 certificates use a digital signature to bind together a public key with an identity. These signatures will often be issued by a certificate authority (CA) associated with an internal or external public key infrastructure (PKI); however, an alternate approach uses self-signed certificates (the certificate is digitally signed by the very same key-pair whose public part appears in the certificate data). The trust models associated with these two approaches are very different.

NOTE Self-signed certificates can be used to form a web of trust (trust decisions are in the hands of individual users/administrators), but is considered less secure as there is no central authority for trust (e.g., no identity assurance or revocation). This reduction in overall security, which may still offer adequate protections for some environments, is accompanied by an easing of the overall complexity of implementation.

[Section 6](#) of IETF RFC 5280 identifies the need for clients and servers to perform basic path validation, extension path validation, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) validation. These validations include, but are not limited to, the following:

- The certificate is a validly constructed certificate
- The signature is correct for the certificate
- The date of its use is within the validity period (i.e., it has not expired)
- The certificate has not been revoked (applies only to PKI certificates)
- The certificate chain is validly constructed, considering the peer certificate plus valid issuer certificates up to the maximum allowed chain depth (applies only to PKI certificates)

X.509 digital certificates come in various formats, but the following are the most commonly used in conjunction with TLS:

- DER-encoded X.509. See ISO/IEC 9594-8:2008 for specification and technical corrigenda
- Base 64-encoded X.509 (often called PEM). See [Section 6.8](#) of IETF RFC 2045

## 6 Requirements

### 6.1 TLS protocol requirements

Storage systems functioning as servers shall implement the TLS protocol; however, its use by clients is optional. TLS version 1.2 (specified in IETF RFC 5246) or later shall be implemented. Servers shall not support SSL (i.e., disable versions 1.0, 2.0<sup>2)</sup>, and 3.0).

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2) IETF RFC 6176 removes TLS 1.2 backward compatibility with SSL such that TLS sessions will never negotiate the use of SSL version 2.0.

Storage systems shall guard against renegotiation attacks (as outlined in IETF RFC 5746), using one of the following approaches:

- Option 1: Disable renegotiations<sup>3)</sup>
- Option 2: Implement the TLS Renegotiation Indication Extension specified in IETF RFC 5746

## 6.2 Cipher suites

### 6.2.1 Required cipher suites for interoperability

Storage systems shall not use MD5 or SHA-1 as the default HMAC, which is different than what is specified in the cipher suite. In addition, storage systems shall support:

- selection and use of signature/hash algorithm pairs, using the *supported\_signature\_algorithms* mechanism in TLS 1.2
- use of SHA-256 or greater strength hashes

Storage systems shall use cipher suites that have at least 112 bits of security strength. In addition, the following cipher suites shall be supported by storage systems and clients accessing them:

- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA {0x00, 0x2F}<sup>4)</sup>
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 {0x00, 0x3C}

NOTE The use of CBC mode encryption carries the theoretical risks associated with padding oracle attacks<sup>5)</sup>. Other encryption modes like GCM do not carry these risks.

### 6.2.2 Recommended cipher suites for enhanced security

The following cipher suites should be supported by storage systems and clients accessing them:

- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 {0x00, 0x3D}
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 {0x00, 0x9C}<sup>6)</sup>
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 {0x00, 0x67}

NOTE TLS\_RSA is strictly weaker than ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (TLS\_DHE) key exchange since it does not provide perfect forward secrecy. Perfect forward secrecy protects past communication sessions even if the long-term private key is compromised.

Since the use of digital certificates can add complexity, especially for mutual authentication, an alternate approach using pre-shared keys is permitted. As such, the following pre-shared key cipher suites should be supported by storage systems and clients accessing them:

- TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 {0x00, 0xAE}
- TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 {0x00, 0xAF}
- TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 {0x00, 0xA8}
- TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 {0x00, 0xA9}

3) This approach may also prevent the use of client-side certificates in certain scenarios.

4) In the absence of an application profile standard this is the mandatory cipher suite for TLS v1.2.

5) Additional information on padding oracle attacks can be found in the *Practical Padding Oracle Attacks* paper by Juliano Rizzo and Thai Duong.

6) GCM ciphersuites for TLS can be found in IETF RFC 5288.

NOTE TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 and TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 use the new authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) algorithms, AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM and AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM, as described in IETF RFC 5116.

In situations where enhanced security is desired or compliance with specialized requirements (e.g., U.S. Government<sup>7)</sup> is necessary, the following cipher suites should be supported:

- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 {0xC0,0x2B}
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 {0xC0,0x2C}

NOTE IETF RFC 6460 states “The TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 cipher suite is preferred; if offered, it MUST appear before the TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 cipher suite.” This IETF RFC also identifies other issues that need to be addressed.

### 6.3 Digital certificates

When digital certificates are used by storage systems and clients that access these systems, the supported certificates shall be X.509 version 3 public key certificates that are conformant with the *Certificate and Certificate Extension Profile* defined in [Section 4](#) of IETF RFC 5280.

Server certificates shall be supported by all storage servers using TLS. Client certificates should be supported by clients accessing storage systems for management operations and data access.

For RSA/DSA server X.509 certificates, key sizes of 2048 bits or greater shall be used.

DER encoded X.509, Base64 encoded X.509, and PKCS#12 certificate formats shall be supported.

Certificate validation as described in [Section 6](#) of IETF RFC 5280 shall be performed by storage systems and clients that are presented a digital certificate. In addition, one of the following approaches shall be used to determine whether a certificate has been revoked:

- Option 1: Use Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL)
  - Supported CRLs shall be in the DER encoded X.509 or the Base64 encoded X.509 formats
  - Valid CRLs stored locally (distribution out of scope for this standard) or retrieved from an external source (e.g., a CRL Distribution Point or CRLDP) shall be used
- Option 2: Use a certificate-status protocol such as OCSP in one of the following ways:
  - Directly use the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as described IETF RFC 6960
  - Indirectly using OCSP through the *Certificate Status Request* extension to TLS described in [Section 8](#) of IETF RFC 6066

## 7 Guidance for the implementation and use of TLS in data storage

### 7.1 Digital certificates

#### 7.1.1 Certificate model

Digital certificates are used to identify servers (or less commonly clients) and provide cryptographic keys for use in communication. These certificates can either be public key certificates or self-signed certificates (as noted in [5.3.4](#)). Public key certificates typically provide more reliable identity assurances but require prior planning and supporting infrastructure (e.g., certificate authorities). Self-signed certificates are very easy to deploy but do not provide a reliable identity assurance. Organizations

7) IETF RFC 6460 identifies cipher suites that comply with the National Security Agency (NSA) Suite B Cryptography profile requirements for TLS.



should make a conscious decision between the two models based on their risk profile and available resources.

### 7.1.2 Chain of trust

The confidence in the identity assurance provided by a certificate really depends on confidence in the entity (i.e., certificate authority) issuing the certificate. Often a trusted certificate authority will issue a certificate to an organization, which will then issue their own certificates (this creates the “chain of trust”). When using public key certificates, organizations should explicitly identify the certificate authorities that are allowed to issue certificates for use within the organization. These trusted CAs should be configured in the client (e.g., web browsers).

### 7.1.3 Certificate lifecycle

Certificates need to be issued, installed, replaced and ultimately removed/revoked. Effective governance of this certificate lifecycle is dependent on the organization developing sound policies and procedures. A commonly overlooked decision is the lifetime of the certificate. Certificates have expiration dates to specify the maximum time a certificate is valid (much like other forms of identity assurances) and at the end of their lifetime, they have to be replaced to avoid “certificate expired” errors. When setting the lifetime, carefully consider the risk, complexity of the certificate request and installation, and the number of certificates involved. For example, if the certificate/request installation process requires 1.5 person hours and there are 10,000 certificates in the organization, setting the certificate lifetime to 1 year would require 8 full-time employees ( $10,000 \times 1.5$  divided by 8 hours per workday divided by 230 workdays per year) just to replace the certificates.

Removal of certificates from devices being repurposed or leaving organization control is an essential measure to protect the organization against unauthorized access.

If a certificate is compromised (e.g., its private key is revealed to an unauthorized person) or if the certificate is no longer needed, the certificate should be revoked (see [7.1.4](#)) to prevent its further use.

### 7.1.4 Revocation

Certificates need to be invalidated (revoked) when they are no longer useful or they have been compromised (e.g., the private key associated with the certificate has come into the possession of an unauthorized party). Certificate revocation is simply the process of adding a certificate to the certificate revocation list (CRL). As described in [6.3](#), clients and other certificate users are required to check the validity of a certificate (i.e., in part to verify that it has not been revoked) before making use of a certificate.

The following important certificate revocation issues should be addressed:

- The sources of the revocation information should be relevant and trustworthy
- The revocation information should be as “fresh” as possible, especially when high value or sensitive data is involved (e.g., a CRL can have lengthy expiration dates that masks the need to retrieve a more current version of the CRL)
- CRLs, similar to certificate chains, can be large so adequate provisions should be made to store and process CRLs when they are used for validation
- When using OCSP directly, users should understand that there can be privacy issues, which necessitate additional protections (e.g., using TLS with OCSP)

## 7.2 Security awareness

Users training (e.g., during security awareness training) is essential in working with certificates. For example, when the organization uses public key certificates, users should be trained to never visit a site that generates a “certificate warning” (issued by an un-trusted CA, expired, etc.) and to report those