
**Information technology —
Telecommunications and information
exchange between systems — NFC
Security —**

**Part 3:
NFC-SEC cryptography standard using
ECDH-256 and AES-GCM**

Technologies de l'information — Téléinformatique — Sécurité NFC —

*Partie 3: Norme de cryptographie NFC-SEC utilisant ECDH-256 et
AES-GCM*

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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).

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For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see the following URL: [Foreword — Supplementary information](#).

ISO/IEC 13157-3 was prepared by Ecma International (as ECMA-409) and was adopted, under a special "fast-track procedure", by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology, in parallel with its approval by national bodies of ISO and IEC.

ISO/IEC 13157 consists of the following parts, under the general title *Information technology — Telecommunications and information exchange between systems — NFC Security*:

- Part 1: *NFC-SEC NFCIP-1 security services and protocol*
- Part 2: *NFC-SEC cryptography standard using ECDH and AES*
- Part 3: *NFC-SEC cryptography standard using ECDH-256 and AES-GCM*
- Part 4: *NFC-SEC entity authentication and key agreement using asymmetric cryptography*
- Part 5: *NFC-SEC entity authentication and key agreement using symmetric cryptography*.

Introduction

The NFC Security series of standards comprise a common services and protocol Standard and NFC-SEC cryptography standards.

This NFC-SEC cryptography Standard specifies cryptographic mechanisms that use the Elliptic Curves Diffie-Hellman (ECDH-256) protocol for key agreement and the AES algorithm in GCM mode to provide data authenticated encryption.

This International Standard addresses secure communication of two NFC devices that do not share any common secret data ("keys") before they start communicating with each other. It is based on ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) with some adaptations to address actual cryptography standards.

This International Standard refers to the latest standards and updates the generation method for StartVar in compliance with ISO/IEC 19772:2009/Cor.1:2014 which also complies with NIST SP 800-38B.

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Information technology — Telecommunications and information exchange between systems — NFC Security —

Part 3:

NFC-SEC cryptography standard using ECDH-256 and AES-GCM

1 Scope

This International Standard specifies the message contents and the cryptographic methods for PID 02.

This International Standard specifies cryptographic mechanisms that use the Elliptic Curves Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol with a key length of 256 bits for key agreement and the AES algorithm in GCM mode to provide data authenticated encryption.

2 Conformance

Conformant implementations employ the security mechanisms specified in this NFC-SEC cryptography Standard (identified by PID 02) and conform to ISO/IEC 13157-1 (ECMA-385).

The NFC-SEC security services shall be established through the protocol specified in ISO/IEC 13157-1 (ECMA-385) and the mechanisms specified in this International Standard.

3 Normative references

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011, *Information technology -- Security techniques -- Message Authentication Codes (MACs) -- Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher*

ISO/IEC 11770-3, *Information technology -- Security techniques -- Key management -- Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques*

ISO/IEC 13157-1, *Information technology -- Telecommunications and information exchange between systems -- NFC Security -- Part 1: NFC-SEC NFCIP-1 security services and protocol* (ECMA-385)

ISO/IEC 13157-2, *Information technology -- Telecommunications and information exchange between systems -- NFC Security -- Part 2: NFC-SEC cryptography standard using ECDH and AES* (ECMA-386)

ISO/IEC 18031:2011, *Information technology -- Security techniques -- Random bit generation*

ISO/IEC 18031:2011/Cor.1:2014, *Information technology -- Security techniques -- Random bit generation -- Technical Corrigendum 1*

ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010, *Information technology -- Security techniques -- Encryption algorithms -- Part 3: Block ciphers*

ISO/IEC 19772:2009, *Information technology -- Security techniques -- Authenticated encryption*

ISO/IEC 19772:2009/Cor.1:2014, *Information technology -- Security techniques -- Authenticated encryption -- Technical Corrigendum 1*

FIPS 186-4, *Digital Signature Standard (DSS)*

4 Terms and definitions

Clause 4 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) applies.

5 Conventions and notations

Clause 5 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) applies.

6 Acronyms

Clause 6 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) applies. Additionally, the following acronyms apply.

| | |
|------|-------------------------------|
| AAD | Additional Authenticated Data |
| GCM | Galois Counter Mode |
| CMAC | Cipher-based MAC |

7 General

Clause 7 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) applies.

8 Protocol Identifier (PID)

This International Standard shall use the one octet protocol identifier PID with value 2.

9 Primitives

This Clause specifies cryptographic primitives. Clauses 11 and 12 specify the actual use of these primitives.

Table 1 summarizes the features.

Table 1 — Summary of features

| | |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| Supported services | SSE (see ISO/IEC 13157-1 (ECMA-385)) SCH (see ISO/IEC 13157-1 (ECMA-385)) |
| Key agreement | ECDH P-256 |
| KDF | AES-CMAC-PRF-128 |
| Key confirmation | AES-CMAC-96 |
| Data authenticated encryption | AES128-GCM |
| Sequence integrity | SN (see ISO/IEC 13157-1 (ECMA-385)) |
| Encryption order | Authenticated encryption (MAC then encrypt) |

9.1 Key agreement

Clause 9.1 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) applies.

9.1.1 Curve P- 256

Curve P-256 as specified in *D.1.2.3 Curve P-256* of FIPS 186-4 shall be used.

9.1.2 EC Key Pair Generation Primitive

Clause 9.1.2 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) applies.

9.1.3 EC Public key validation

Clause 9.1.3 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) applies.

9.1.4 ECDH secret value derivation Primitive

Clause 9.1.4 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) applies.

9.1.5 Random nonces

Each peer NFC-SEC entity shall send fresh random nonces with the EC public key of the entity.

The entity shall guarantee that the nonces it generates have 128 bits of entropy valid for the duration of the protocol. The nonces used in an NFC-SEC transaction shall be cryptographically uncorrelated with the nonces from a previous transaction, see also ISO/IEC 18031.

9.2 Key Derivation Functions

Two Key Derivation Functions (KDF) are specified; one for the SSE and one for the SCH.

The PRF shall be AES in CMAC mode as specified in MAC algorithm 5 of ISO/IEC 9797-1, used with 128 bits output length, denoted AES-CMAC-PRF-128.

For the following sections PRF is:

$$\text{PRF}(K, S) = \text{AES-CMAC-PRF-128K}(S)$$

The random source (nonces and the SharedSecret z obtained from 9.1.4) used for the SCH shall be different from the random source used for the SSE.

9.2.1 KDF for the SSE

The KDF for the SSE is:

$$MK_{SSE} = \text{KDF-SSE} (\text{Nonce}_S, \text{Nonce}_R, ID_S, ID_R, \text{SharedSecret})$$

Detail of the KDF-SSE function:

$$\text{Seed} = (\text{Nonce}_S [1..64] \parallel \text{Nonce}_R [1..64])$$

$$\text{KEYSEED} = \text{PRF} (\text{Seed}, \text{SharedSecret})$$

$$MK_{SSE} = \text{PRF} (\text{KEYSEED}, \text{Seed} \parallel ID_S \parallel ID_R \parallel (01))$$

9.2.2 KDF for the SCH

The KDF for the SCH is:

$$\{MK_{SCH}, K_{SCH}\} = \text{KDF-SCH} (\text{Nonce}_S, \text{Nonce}_R, ID_S, ID_R, \text{SharedSecret})$$

Detail of the KDF-SCH function:

$$\text{Seed} = (\text{Nonce}_S [1..64] \parallel \text{Nonce}_R [1..64])$$

$$\text{KEYSEED} = \text{PRF} (\text{Seed}, \text{SharedSecret})$$

$$MK_{SCH} = \text{PRF} (\text{KEYSEED}, \text{Seed} \parallel ID_S \parallel ID_R \parallel (01))$$

$$K_{SCH} = \text{PRF} (\text{KEYSEED}, MK_{SCH} \parallel \text{Seed} \parallel ID_S \parallel ID_R \parallel (02))$$

9.3 Key Usage

Each derived key MK_{SCH} , K_{SCH} and MK_{SSE} shall be used only for the purpose specified in Table 2.

The Keys MK_{SCH} , K_{SCH} , and MK_{SSE} shall be different for each NFC-SEC transaction.

Table 2 — Key usage

| Key | Key description | Key usage |
|------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| MK_{SCH} | Master Key for SCH | Key Verification for the Secure Channel Keys |
| K_{SCH} | Authenticated Encryption Key for SCH | Authenticated Encryption of data packets sent through SCH |
| MK_{SSE} | Master Key for SSE | Master Key for SSE used as Shared secret to be passed to the upper layer and as Key Verification |

9.4 Key Confirmation

When a key is derived using one of the KDF processes specified in 9.2 both NFC-SEC entities check that they indeed have the same key. Each entity shall generate a key confirmation tag as specified in 9.4.1 and shall send it to the peer entity. Entities shall verify the key confirmation tag upon reception as specified in 9.4.2.

This key confirmation mechanism is according to 9, *Key Confirmation*, of ISO/IEC 11770-3.

9.4.1 Key confirmation tag generation

MacTag, the Key confirmation tag, equals

MAC-KC (K, MsgID, IDS, IDR, PKS, PKR) and shall be calculated using AES-CMAC-96_K (MsgID || ID_S || ID_R || PK_S || PK_R), specified in MAC algorithm 5 of ISO/IEC 9797-1 with 96-bit truncated output in msb-first order, with key K.

The MsgID field is specified at each invocation of MAC-KC.

9.4.2 Key confirmation tag verification

Clause 9.4.2 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) applies.

9.5 Data Authenticated Encryption

The underlying block cipher used is AES as specified in 5.1 AES of ISO/IEC 18033-3 with a block size of 128 bits.

The data authenticated encryption mode shall be GCM mode as specified in 11 *Authenticated encryption mechanism 6 (GCM)* of ISO/IEC 19772.

9.5.1 Starting Variable (StartVar)

To ensure that Starting Variable StartVar is distinct for every message to be protected, it shall be generated by both entities from the nonces in the following way:

StartVal shall be generated using bit [17..112] of AES-CMAC-PRF-128_{MK} (MK, K_{SCH} || NA || NB || (03)), with the key MK.

9.5.2 Additional Authenticated Data (AAD)

This data is only authenticated, but not encrypted.

$$\text{AAD} = \text{SEP} \parallel \text{PID} \parallel \text{S3} \parallel \text{S2} \parallel \text{S1}$$

The 3-octet value of SNV equals S3 || S2 || S1 where S1 is the LSB and S3 is the MSB.

For the NFC-SEC-PDUs where PID is prohibited (see *Table 2 – NFC-SEC-PDU Fields* of ISO/IEC 13157-1 (ECMA-385), PID is replaced by one byte (00).

9.5.3 Generation-Encryption

The data shall be authenticated and encrypted using the Secure Channel Key K_{SCH} as specified in 11.6 *Encryption procedure* of ISO/IEC 19772 with t = 96:

$$\text{AuthEncData} = \text{GEN-ENC}_{\text{K}_{\text{SCH}}} (\text{AAD}, \text{StartVar}, \text{Data})$$

9.5.4 Decryption-Verification

The authenticated and encrypted data shall be decrypted and verified using the Secure Channel Key K_{SCH} as specified in 11.7 *Decryption procedure* of ISO/IEC 19772 with t = 96:

$$\text{DEC-VER}_{\text{K}_{\text{SCH}}} (\text{AAD}, \text{StartVar}, \text{AuthEncData}) \text{ shall return Data' if valid}$$

INVALID otherwise

9.6 Data Integrity

The requirements in 9.5.3 and 9.5.4 provide data integrity.

9.7 Message Sequence Integrity

Clause 9.7 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) applies.

10 Data Conversions

Clause 10 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) applies.

11 SSE and SCH service invocation

Clause 11 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) applies.

12 SCH data exchange

After invocation of the SCH as specified in 11, the data exchange between two NFC-SEC entities uses the protocol specified in ISO/IEC 13157-1 (ECMA-385) as illustrated in Figure 1 and further specified in this Clause.




Figure 1 — SCH: protocol overview

12.1 Preparation

NFC-SEC entities A and B shall initialise the Sequence Number variable (SNV) as specified in 9.7.

NFC-SEC senders shall initialise the Starting Variable (StartVar) as specified in 9.5.1.